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TRENDS IN COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA
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
31 JAN 1973

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F B I S

TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda



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TOPICS AND EVENTS GIVEN MAJOR ATTENTION 22 - 28 JANUARY 1973

Moscow (2937 items)

Vietnam	(7%)	21%
[Peace Accord	(--)	17%]
Luna 21 Moon Landing	(10%)	6%
PAIGC Leader Cabral's	(--)	6%
Assassination		
Soviet Party/Govern-	(--)	4%
ment Approval of		
Brezhnev/Pompidou		
Meeting		
Anniversary of Indian	(--)	4%
Republic		
China	(2%)	2%

Peking (1067 items)

Domestic Issues	(53%)	45%
Vietnam	(8%)	24%
[Peace Accord	(--)	20%]
PAIGC Leader Cabral's	(--)	8%
Assassination		
Soviet Reconnaissance	(--)	3%
Flights Near Japan		

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.

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INDOCHINA

Hanoi has mounted an extraordinary campaign to publicize its "victory" in concluding the peace agreement. The most authoritative reaction was a 28 January joint Dkv party-government appeal which, like other propaganda, makes it clear that Hanoi regards the removal of the United States from the conflict as the main achievement. The appeal said this "victory" provides a basis for achieving "the national democratic revolution" throughout the country. Hanoi initially treated the United States circumspectly, but on the 29th a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman followed the PRG's lead in charging the United States as well as Saigon with "overtly violating the agreement" right after its conclusion. And on the 31st a higher-level DRV Foreign Ministry statement held the United States and Saigon jointly responsible for seeing that there are no further violations of the accord.

The most substantial discussion of the peace agreement and its implementation to date came in a 31 January NHAN DAN editorial which claimed that the agreement has a "legal significance" for international problems other than Vietnam. The editorial also suggested that all the signators are responsible for implementing the provisions for a political settlement in South Vietnam, and it indicated that their attitudes toward the National Council for Reconciliation would be the touchstone.

Both Moscow and Peking conveyed their endorsement of the agreement at the highest level in congratulatory messages from their top leaders to the DRV and PRG leaderships. The Soviet leaders' message, taking a line amplified by Brezhnev at a banquet honoring the DRV's Tho and Trinh, welcomed the settlement for its salutary effects on the international scene. Moscow's comment has pervasively cited the role of Soviet aid and of "the socialist community" as a factor leading to an agreement.

Peking acclaimed the agreement as "a tremendous victory" for the Vietnamese people that will have "a positive influence" on the reduction of tension in Asia. A PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial on the day after the signing ceremonies declared that the Chinese and Vietnamese "are of the same family" and pledged continuing Chinese support in the "new stage" of the Vietnamese struggle. The editorial also took the occasion to call for independence of the "hegemonists."

DRV SAYS PEACE ACCORD IS A "VICTORY," DEMANDS IMPLEMENTATION

North Vietnam has welcomed the Vietnam peace agreement as a "victory," bringing the end to U.S. involvement in the war, and as a tool to

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continue the national democratic revolution in the South. The DRV's professed jubilation toward the accord was underlined by a marathon campaign to publicize the agreement and protocols in Hanoi broadcasts to domestic and foreign audiences. Hanoi radio's Vietnamese-language service extended regular daytime programs and ignored the usual sign-off time to remain on the air through the night from 24 through 27 January, repeatedly broadcasting the agreement and protocols along with North Vietnamese comment on them. According to Hanoi radio's review of the press, texts of the agreement and protocols were published on the 26th in the party paper NHAN DAN and the army paper QUAN DOI NHAN DAN and on the 27th in other Hanoi papers.

Hanoi marked 27 January, the day the accord was signed, with a decree from Pham Van Dong that flags be flown for eight days to greet the occasion and with Vietnam Workers Party (VWP) Central Committee slogans to celebrate the "victory." Eight hours before the cease-fire was to take effect, Hanoi broadcast an order from the DRV army (VPA) High Command noting that the peace agreement had been signed and that the cease-fire would come into effect at 0700 Hanoi time on 28 January (2400 GMT on the 27th). The order welcomed the agreement in standard terms but warned that peace has yet to be consolidated. It called upon the people to "struggle for the successful building of socialism in the North and the completion of the national, democratic, and people's revolution throughout the country with a view to realizing at all costs the noble objective: to build a peaceful, unified, independent, democratic, strong, and prosperous Vietnam." The order directed that the army maintain vigilance, consolidate peace, and "stand ready to smash all schemes and acts of provocation and sabotage and all acts of war of the aggressors and the warmongers against the socialist North"

PARTY-GOVERNMENT APPEAL Hanoi's most authoritative comment on the peace accord came in a party-government appeal* broadcast at 2300 GMT--an hour before the cease-fire went into effect. Scattered Hanoi comments on the accord

* The signing of the Geneva agreements in July 1954 prompted separate appeals from Ho Chi Minh and the VWP Central Committee. Joint party-government appeals are known to have been issued previously on only two occasions--both since Ho's death in 1969. The earlier appeals were both prompted by major U.S. escalations: One on 16 April 1972, responding to the resumption of air strikes in the DRV, and one on 10 December 1970 protesting intensified air strikes and the abortive U.S. attempt to rescue POW's.

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prior to the release of the appeal had generally echoed remarks by Pham Van Dong on the 24th, welcoming the agreement as a "great victory" for the Vietnamese struggle and for the solidarity between the Vietnamese people and the people of the socialist and other countries.* While echoing many of the themes in earlier propaganda, the appeal was more direct in stressing that the communists' primary achievement through the accords was the removal of the United States from the conflict. It referred repeatedly to the signing of the agreement as a "victory of the resistance against U.S. aggression," and it claimed that this victory "has ushered in a new turning point in the Vietnamese revolution."

The appeal also clearly viewed the accord as a tool in a continuing struggle to achieve basic communist objectives. Thus, it declared that the agreement

is the political and legal basis ensuring the fundamental national rights of our people and the sacred right to self-determination of our compatriots in the South. This victory is the basis for our people to march forward and win new victories and achieve the national democratic revolution throughout the country.

Like earlier comment, the appeal warned of obstacles ahead for the struggle in the South, charging that "the militarist and fascist forces, instruments of neocolonialism . . . have not yet renounced their scheme to sabotage peace and block the road to independence and freedom of our people." Projecting the immediate tasks "in both zones of the country" in the context of this alleged threat to peace, the appeal called for strengthened solidarity, vigilance, and efforts to consolidate the successes already won, preserve lasting peace, achieve independence and democracy in the South, and proceed to the peaceful reunification of the country. At another point, the appeal restated the basic communist position that "Vietnam is one. The Vietnamese nation is one." And it urged efforts--"on the road to reunion"--to establish normal relations between the "two zones."

The appeal also underlined the dramatic shift in the tasks which will face the North with the coming of peace. The current "victory," it claimed, "has created unprecedented favorable

* Pham Van Dong's comments were reported in the 24 January 1973 TRENDS, pages 1-2.

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conditions for the North of our country to forge ahead with the building of socialism." It reiterated the standard DRV tenet that strengthening the North plays a part in achieving the goals of independence and democracy in the South, and it added an impassioned plea:

Let everybody, after decades of war, enter the stage of peaceful construction with high revolutionary zeal and in a stirring emulation movement. Let us translate the revolutionary heroism we have displayed in combat into our determination to overcome all difficulties in order to accelerate, at a greater tempo than ever before, the socialist construction and the building of a new life and the new man.

The appeal made a point of referring to the NFLSV and the PRG as the "only authentic representatives of the people in the southern part of the country." Hanoi has always maintained that the NFLSV and PRG are the genuine southern representatives, but rarely in the past four years has it explicitly claimed that they are the "only" such representative. Hanoi may have been prompted to use this formulation now by President Nixon's statement, in his 23 January speech announcing the agreement, that the United States will continue to recognize the NVN as the "sole legitimate government of South Vietnam." One of the few press commentaries on the agreement which preceded the appeal--an article in the 27 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN--criticized the President for "impudently stating that the United States recognized the Saigon administration as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam and that peace in Vietnam was fragile," but the paper did not indicate when such statements were made. Hanoi has not otherwise alluded either to the President's speech or to his subsequent comments to members of Congress in which he reportedly remarked on the fragility of peace in Vietnam.

EDITORIAL COMMENT On the 28th VNA noted that there was a meeting of more than 20,000 people in Hanoi to celebrate the "victory of the resistance" and welcome the party-government appeal. And the publication of the appeal in Hanoi papers that day was accompanied by the first comprehensive editorial reaction to the peace agreement. The NHAN DAN editorial repeated much of the language of the appeal, while the editorial in QUAN DOI NHAN DAN stressed the military significance of the conclusion of the peace agreement. The editorial in the army paper, like the appeal,

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called particular attention to the removal, through the peace agreement, of the United States as a factor in the communists' continuing struggle. Noting that "for the first time in 100 years" our country is "completely free from all aggressors' shadows," the paper predicted new "big leaps forward in the days ahead." In this context, it declared that "the South is overcoming the greatest obstacle in its advance and is creating new favorable conditions to surge forward on the path of complete liberation.

Both of the editorials on the 28th underlined, even more than did the appeal, the nationalistic tenor of North Vietnam's comment on the peace agreement. This element had been apparent throughout the comment on the issue of foreign assistance. In all the reaction to the signing of the accord, only the VWP Central Committee slogans and a Vietnam Fatherland Front resolution* specifically named the Soviet Union and China as having given support and assistance; other propaganda referred vaguely to "socialist" aid. Moreover, the slogans as well as other propaganda have in effect downgraded the significance of communist aid by consistently lumping it with support from "progressives" throughout the world.

National pride was stressed by the NHAN DAN and QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorials in their discussion of Vietnam's theoretical contribution to the rest of the world. Thus, NHAN DAN went beyond the appeal's more conventional allusion to the "creative political and military line of our party" when it declared that the party,

loyal disciples of Marxism-Leninism, upholding the spirit of independence and sovereignty, has combined genuine patriotism with pure internationalism and successfully solved the complicated problems of the Vietnamese revolution and contributed experiences to the theoretical treasure of the world revolution.

Similarly, the 28 January QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial claimed that Vietnam had "clarified many hot problems of the era and served as a base of revolutionary theory for the proletariat." It added that "the victory of the Vietnamese people's resistance is the brilliant victory of Vietnam's military art and an important contribution to the development of the revolutionary military science." Another QUAN DOI NHAN DAN editorial, on the 30th, further lauded the Vietnamese party and also raised a polemical issue, commenting that the party had "smashed to pieces the crafty tricks of U.S.

* The Vietnam Fatherland Front resolution was adopted at a 29 January conference which heard speeches by DRV President Ton Duc Thang and Politburo members Pham Van Dong and Truong Chinh.

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imperialism aimed at sowing dissension,* thus greatly contributing to the solidarity of the revolutionary forces in the world." It went on to praise at length the selflessness and high purpose of VWP members, fighting for the sake of "the happiness of our people and fraternal nations." It effusively hailed "members of the VWP" who have "enhanced the qualities of communists, the noblest human beings of the present era who do not feel disturbed in face of danger and who cannot be bought with money or subdued by intimidation."

On 29 January Hanoi papers highlighted the NFLSV/PRG appeal of the 28th on the peace agreement and welcomed it in editorial comment. The NHAN DAN editorial, in assessing the balance of forces in the South, claimed that the "reactionaries" were disintegrating because of the end of U.S. military involvement, that the revolutionary administration was being perfected, and that the communists controlled vast areas and a victorious army and powerful political forces. It also echoed the appeal's suggestion that the agreement would be the foundation for future struggles when it noted that "the right of self-determination and other democratic freedoms stipulated by the agreement are the basis for our compatriots in enemy-controlled areas to step up their struggle in diversified forms."

VIOLATION PROTESTS,
ATTITUDE TOWARD U.S.

Initial Hanoi comment on the peace agreement was, for the most part, careful not to raise doubts about future U.S. actions.

However, by 29 January Hanoi began to take note of alleged violations of the agreement in the South and to underline its concern about U.S. policies. On that day Hanoi media publicized a 28 January communique from the communist military command in the South protesting alleged ARVN violations of the cease-fire, as well as a 29 January statement by the PRG Foreign Ministry's spokesman denouncing these

* A December HOC TAP article by Hoang Quoc Viet, VWP Central Committee member and chairman of the Vietnam Fatherland Front, had revived the charge that President Nixon's policies are aimed at splitting "the socialist camp." PRG Foreign Minister Mme. Nguyen Thi Binh had also raised this issue in a 29 December rally speech in Peking as well as in her speech at the 8-10 January PRG Council of Ministers meeting.

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violations and charging Saigon with attempting to prevent the PRG and DRV delegations from attending a preparatory meeting of the four-party Joint Military Commission on the 28th. Also on the 29th, a statement by the DRV Foreign Ministry spokesman endorsed the PRG protest and followed its example in charging both the United States and Saigon with "overtly violating the agreement right after its conclusion."

The level of the DRV's protests was raised on 31 January when Hanoi issued a foreign ministry statement again protesting military operations and the treatment of the military delegations. The statement differed from the earlier DRV protest in focusing its charges only on Saigon for the alleged violations while holding the United States and the GVN jointly responsible for seeing that there are no such actions in the future. The statement suggested that Saigon was deliberately undercutting the supervisory role of the military commissions: It charged that Saigon's action had prevented the central and regional Joint Military Commissions from starting operations on schedule and that "this action is a premeditated action aimed at serving the scheme of continuing the military acts of nibbling at the liberated zone and the police operations to repress and massacre the people, in gross violation of the agreement."

Clearly holding the United States equally responsible for Saigon's actions, the statement "demanded" that the United States and the Saigon administration "not allow the recurrence of such arrogant actions." It added that "the DRV Government stresses that the U.S. side and the Saigon side have the responsibility of implementing correctly the provisions and the agreements concerning the Joint Military Commissions so that these joint organizations can quickly operate on schedule."

The party-government appeal and most other comment had not directly suggested that the United States might impede the implementation of the accord, although this was implied by Le Duc Tho in his Paris press conference on the 24th. In fact, the appeal made a point of saying that it is the DRV's "sincere desire" to "entertain friendly relations with all countries, including the United States." However, following the initial PRG and DRV protests, a Hanoi radio commentary on the 30th explicitly questioned U.S. intentions. Charging that the "serious and brazen violations" of the agreement by the United States and Saigon "have not occurred accidentally," the commentary cited as documentation both President Thieu's 28 January radio talk and

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Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Sullivan's remarks in his Meet the Press TV interview on the 28th. The radio charged that Sullivan "sought to cover up" violations by the Saigon administration and that he "hinted" at the possibility of resuming U.S. military intervention in South Vietnam. It said his observation that the United States is maintaining its air force units in Thailand and that U.S. naval forces are still off the Vietnam coast "makes one question the U.S. attitude toward seriously implementing the agreement."

The responsibility of the parties to the agreement in implementing its provisions was stressed in a 31 January NHAN DAN editorial, which claimed that the agreement has a "legal significance" for "international problems" other than Vietnam. The editorial indicated that steps toward its implementation would bring new prospects for peace in Indochina and Southeast Asia as well as prospects for improved U.S.-DRV relations. Conversely, the paper added, "every scheme and act of any dark force aimed at hampering and sabotaging the implementation of the agreement will not only create disastrous consequences in Vietnam, but also poison the political atmosphere and international relations." It is possible that the intention here was to suggest that a detente between the United States and other communist nations would not be likely to develop if the Vietnam accord is not fully implemented. DRV Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh, in his 25 January statement upon arrival in Paris, had professed confidence that sympathy and support from the DRV's "brothers and friends" will "continue and intensify in order to increase the strength of the Vietnamese people in their struggle to insure scrupulous implementation of the Paris agreement and guarantee stable peace in Vietnam."

The editorial is striking for its linkage of the four signatories' "legal" responsibility for the implementation of the agreement with the need for prompt formation of the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. Consistent with Hanoi's hope that the Council will be a coalition administration to guide the South in the coming period, the editorial declared: "In the present situation in South Vietnam, where there exist two administrations, two armies, and three political forces, the Council is the structure to play a great role in the settlement of the internal affairs and in the political life of South Vietnam."

Suggesting that the United States as well as Saigon must guarantee the implementation of the political elements of the agreement, the editorial added: "The attitude toward the Council will be the manifestation of a sense of responsibility of each signatory to the agreement toward the implementation of the agreement."

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NFLSV/PRG HAIL PEACE AGREEMENT, APPEAL FOR "NATIONAL CONCORD"

Liberation Radio publicized the texts of the peace agreement and protocols, though not on the massive scale that Hanoi replayed them. Liberation Radio commentaries, beginning on the 24th, predictably stressed the importance of "national concord" in the coming period, calling upon personnel in the Saigon army and police force to desert when peace comes. Reacting before Hanoi did to statements by the GVN on the cease-fire, a Liberation Radio commentary on the 25th, for example, scored Saigon's heightened security measures. The commentary implicated the United States when it charged that Saigon acted "upon the foreigners' order" in "resorting to repressive and terrorist measures." On the 26th the radio decried Thieu's 24 January speech as "truculent" and maintained that "it will not be our fault if the atrocious war goes on." Paralleling Hanoi propaganda in pointing out the significance of the agreement in achieving U.S. withdrawal, a 26 January radio commentary noted that for the first time since 1858 there would be no "foreign aggressor in Vietnam."

NFLSV/PRG media on the 27th released a cease-fire order from the army (PLAF) Command calling upon the communist forces to observe the cease-fire coming into effect the following day. The order warned that "there are aggressive forces, dependent on foreigners, which have not stopped trying to divide our nation," and it added that "these forces are seeking to hinder the implementation of the agreement, undermine national concord, sabotage peace, and rekindle hostilities." Spelling out tasks for the PLAF in the coming days, the order, among other things, called upon the army to give protection and assistance to the four-party and two-party Joint Military Commissions and the ICCS.

JOINT APPEAL Paralleling DRV reaction, an NFLSV/PRG joint appeal hailed the accord as a "great victory" which will bring about a situation "very advantageous for the completion of the national and democratic revolution." Underlining the communists' view of the accord as a tool to gain their goals, the appeal called it a "new weapon in our hand." It also warned that while the NFLSV and PRG would "strictly implement" the agreement, there are "reactionary, militarist, and fascist forces dependent on foreign countries" who are scheming to sabotage peace. At the same time, it assumed a conciliatory tone in expressing hope that the Saigon administration would "rapidly form through sincere consultations" the National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord in order to

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hold general elections and allow the South Vietnamese to freely decide their political regime. Like the DRV appeal, however, it called the PRG "the only authentic representative of the South Vietnamese people." The appeal predictably reaffirmed the willingness of the Front and PRG to cooperate with "all persons without consideration of their past" who "now advocate peace, independence, democracy, and national concord."

In listing provisions of the agreement which should be implemented, the appeal called for promptly establishing normal relations in all fields with the North and holding early negotiations with the DRV to advance to peaceful reunification. It took note of the North's continuing role in supporting the southern struggle when it declared: "The South Vietnamese people have complete confidence in the 22 million of our compatriots who are building North Vietnam to make it strong and firm in all fields to serve as a prop for the whole country in the struggle to firmly preserve peace, achieve independence and democracy, and proceed to the peaceful reunification of the country."

VIOLATION PROTESTS, Some six hours after the start of the cease-
CRITICISM OF U.S. fire, Liberation Radio decried a Saigon government military operation launched on the 27th north of Cua Viet, in Quang Tri Province, and charged that South Vietnamese marines had continued to advance toward liberated areas there after the cease-fire agreement came into effect. This Saigon operation was again condemned in a 28 January PLAF Command spokesman's statement, which accused the GVN of conducting "many acts violating the agreement in a blatant manner."

A 28 January PRG Foreign Ministry spokesman's statement not only condemned GVN forces' "nibbling operations" in Quang Tri, Tay Ninh, and elsewhere, but also scored the GVN for "causing difficulties" for the DRV and PRG delegations to the Joint Military Commission, demanding that they "go through entry processing like ordinary passengers." It maintained that Saigon had deliberately prevented the delegations from attending the scheduled 28 January meeting of the commission and charged that "these were very grave violations" of the agreement. Placing equal blame on the United States, the statement charged that "the doubledealing action by the U.S. and Saigon administration" was "part of a dark, premeditated design." To document this view, it cited President Nixon's statement that the peace in Vietnam is precarious, as well as Thieu's 24 January speech.

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President Nixon's 23 January speech was assailed in an LPA commentary on the 29th which deplored his statement that the United States recognizes the Saigon administration as the only legal government of South Vietnam. The commentary also scored a claim to legitimacy by Thieu and maintained that "these statements contravene the content and terms" of the Vietnam agreement.

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EVOLUTION OF ELEMENTS OF THE PEACE ACCORD IN DRV PROPAGANDA

The text of the final peace agreement reproduces much of the language of the summary of the draft accord which Hanoi released on 26 October--described by Dr. Kissinger as essentially accurate. Some portions of the agreement, such as Chapter VII, Article 20 on Laos and Cambodia, are identical with the October summary. While in the absence of a publicized text of the October draft the evolution of some elements cannot be traced with precision, Hanoi propaganda has reflected the evolution of the language on a number of points. The background on Hanoi's treatment of various elements of the accord over the years is reviewed below:

+ Chapter I: The single article is virtually identical with point one in the summary of the peace accord released by Hanoi on 26 October. The only new element is the interjection that "all other countries" as well as the United States respect the independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Vietnam as recognized by the 1954 Geneva agreements. A 3 December NHAN DAN editorial had suggested that the inclusion of this first article was a concession on the part of the United States: NHAN DAN said the negotiations were able to proceed favorably and lead to the completion of the text of the agreement because the United States finally recognized "the sacred inviolable national rights of the Vietnamese people as well as the South Vietnamese people's right to self-determination, which the U.S. side had opposed tooth and nail for four years." This means, the editorial added, that the United States "has finally agreed to respect Vietnam's territorial integrity and unity after so many years of its war of aggression."

+ Chapter II: Divided into six articles, this chapter supplies the details for the provisions on a cease-fire and U.S. withdrawal outlined in point two of the October summary. The summary said that in addition to a cease-fire in South Vietnam, the United States would stop all military activities and end the bombing and mining of the DRV. The text specifies (in Article 2) that the United States will stop military action against the DRV by ground, air, and naval forces wherever they may be based and that it will remove, deactivate, or destroy the mines. The demand on air and naval action was developed in Hanoi propaganda in the fall of 1971. The PRG's 1 July 1971 proposal had called on the United States to "put an end to its war of aggression" in Vietnam.* But DRV

* The DRV's nine-point proposal--as published by Hanoi media in January 1972, after President Nixon's 25 January disclosure that such a proposal had been made in secret talks with Kissinger on 26 June 1971--called for the withdrawal of all U.S. and allied forces during 1971, but it did not include a call for an end to U.S. military action.

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Foreign Minister Nguyen Duy Trinh in a 24 October 1971 speech, during the visit of a high-level North Korean delegation, embellished the PRG proposal and demanded that the United States "stop all activities of the U.S. air force and navy." Premier Pham Van Dong, speaking in Peking on 20 November of that year, elaborated further when he said the United States must "put an end to all military acts, in any form and from any place whatsoever, against the Vietnamese people in the two zones." Dong's formulation, which is reflected in the text of the peace agreement, was not incorporated in either the PRG's 2 February 1972 "elaboration" of its 1 July 1971 proposal or in the PRG's 11 September 1972 statement.

Article 3 of the text goes beyond Hanoi's summary in dealing with the specifics of a cease-fire. However, Article 4, stating that the United States will not continue its military involvement or intervene in the internal affairs of South Vietnam, repeats verbatim the final sentence of point two in the summary.

Article 5 specifies that the categories of U.S. and allied personnel to be withdrawn from South Vietnam in 60 days are troops, military advisers, and military personnel, including technical military personnel, and military personnel associated with the pacification program.

As in the description of U.S. military activities which must end, the categories of U.S. personnel which the communists said must be withdrawn have been expanded since 1971. The PRG's July 1971 proposal called simply for withdrawal of troops and military personnel. Foreign Minister Trinh and Pham Van Dong, in their above mentioned speeches in the fall of 1971, repeated these categories and added military advisers. Their list was repeated in the 2 February 1972 PRG proposals as well as in the 11 September 1972 PRG statement, which also added technical personnel. The call in the peace agreement for the withdrawal of military personnel associated with the pacification program is new, as is the additional demand that advisers to all paramilitary organizations and the police force withdraw.* In his 24 December TV interview on ABC's Issues and Answers, Xuan Thuy said that in

* In his 24 January press conference on the agreement Kissinger described the categories for withdrawal as in effect all military personnel and all civilian personnel dealing with combat operations. He said that the United States is permitted to retain economic advisers and civilian technicians serving in certain military branches.

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October the United States had accepted the total withdrawal of military personnel and military advisers but in November insisted on maintaining them in the guise of civilian personnel.

Article 7 prohibiting the two Vietnamese parties in the South from receiving men or materiel adds technical personnel to the summary's listing of troops, military advisers, and military personnel.

+ Chapter III: The October summary said cryptically and ambiguously that "the return of all captured and detained personnel of the parties shall be carried out in parallel [song song] with U.S. troop withdrawal." Article 8 of the text specifies that in the same period as the one for U.S. withdrawal--that is, 60 days--all military prisoners and foreign civilians will be released. And it states that the return of Vietnamese civilian prisoners detained in South Vietnam will be resolved by the two Vietnamese parties--if possible within 90 days--on the basis of the principles of Article 21b of the 1954 agreement. Kissinger in his 26 October press conference, the day Hanoi released the summary of the accord, said there was a separate provision that the future of South Vietnamese civilians detained in South Vietnam would be determined through negotiations among South Vietnamese. According to AFP, Xuan Thuy in an interview on 10 November had confirmed Kissinger's statements, saying that while the DRV believed all prisoners should be freed at the same time, it had accepted the U.S. position in order to show its goodwill. Hanoi media did not report Xuan Thuy's remark. Moreover, just two days before his interview an 8 November NHAN DAN editorial seemed to beg the question of timing when--in attacking President Thieu's alleged stepped-up political arrests and assassinations--it said that the peace agreement "provides for the release of all captured patriots and military men and civilian internees." A 5 December NHAN DAN editorial departed from the language in Hanoi's summary of the accord when instead of saying the prisoners would be released "in parallel" with U.S. troop withdrawal, it said that there would be "a stipulated time" for the release of prisoners.*

* Kissinger observed in his 24 January press conference that separating the question of U.S. prisoners from that of Vietnam civilian prisoners presented enormous difficulties throughout the negotiations, that the issue was settled at one point and kept reappearing, and that it was one of the difficulties during the December negotiations.

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+ Chapter IV, (Articles 9-14): Dealing with South Vietnamese self-determination, Article 12 provides for the setting up of a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord of three equal segments. Kissinger recalled in his 24 January press conference that the October draft accord had designated the Council as an administrative structure but that this designation had been dropped from the final accord. He called this deletion the removal of a linguistic ambiguity, since the Vietnamese word in the October draft was one that could lead to the interpretation that the body came close to a coalition government. The Western press had reported that in a 4 November interview Kissinger indicated that the United States wished to use the least vague of three Vietnamese terms for administration. Communist proposals in the past which demanded a coalition government had used the unmistakable term for government, "chinh phu." The Vietnamese word in the October summary which was translated as administrative was "chin quyen." A less ambiguous term for administration would be "hanh chanh" or "hanh chinh." A Saigon broadcast on 14 November, pegged to General Haig's visit, indicated that the GVN would not be mollified by a change in the Vietnamese term when it said that the North Vietnamese intend to impose a three-segment government ("chanh phu") described as an administrative ("hanh chanh") structure.

The text of Article 12 also echoes the October summary in saying that there will be consultations about the formation of councils of reconciliation and concord at lower levels. The Vietnamese communists' concern regarding this issue seemed reflected in a flurry of propaganda in December--after President Thieu's 12 December speech and the adjournment of the Kissinger-Le Duc Tho talks. A NHAN DAN editorial on 17 December said that Thieu's speech had exposed his scheme to change the contents of the October agreement, including the formation of councils of reconciliation and concord of three equal segments at "all levels."* This provision of the peace proposal was again cited in NHAN DAN Commentator articles on 18 and 19 December and in an editorial in the party paper on the 20th, as well as in a 16 December PRG statement on Thieu's speech and in NFLSV Chairman Nguyen Huu Tho's speech at a meeting marking the Front's 19 December anniversary. PRG President Huynh Tan Phat also repeated the provision in his report at an 8-10 January PRG Council of Ministers meeting.

* Xuan Thuy, in his 24 December interview on American TV, said it was obvious that in October the United States and the DRV agreed that the council would be organized from the central level to lower levels, but that in December Kissinger wanted to delete all lower levels and reduce the task of the National Council only to that of organizing general elections.

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Article 13 repeats the basic language of the summary in saying that the question of Vietnam armed forces in the South shall be settled by the two South Vietnamese parties "as soon as possible" and that among the questions to be discussed are steps to reduce their military effectives and to demobilize the troops being reduced. The communist position that the question of Vietnamese armed forces should be settled by the South Vietnamese parties has been reflected in every NFLSV/PRG proposal since May 1969. In the latter half of November Hanoi had first acknowledged Thieu's objections that the October draft peace accord did not call for the withdrawal of North Vietnam troops from the South. A 25 November Commentator article indicated that Thieu's arguments were regarded as academic since, Commentator observed, the United States had agreed in October that the question of Vietnamese armed forces would be solved by the two Vietnamese sides.

Article 14 on South Vietnam's postwar policy was not reflected in the October summary, but a similar provision has been included in past PRG proposals--for example, point 5 of the 1 July 1971 proposal and point 6 of the 8 May 1969 proposal. Where the peace agreement says that South Vietnam will pursue a policy of "peace and independence," the PRG proposals had said peace and "neutrality." The references in the article to establishing relations with all countries and accepting economic and technical aid also parallels provisions in the PRG proposals. However, a new element is the final stipulation in Article 14 that the acceptance of military aid shall come under the authority of the government set up after the general elections.

+ Chapter V: Article 15 on reunification and the relationship between North and South Vietnam had not been reflected in detail in the October summary, which in Point 5 had said cryptically that "reunification should be carried out step by step through peaceful means." Article 15 repeats much of point 4 of the 1 July 1971 PRG proposal, with some variations. Thus, while the 1971 proposal, like earlier proposals, had said reunification would be on the basis of agreements between the two "zones," the peace agreement makes it between North and South Vietnam. The agreement adds that "the time for reunification" will be agreed upon by North and South Vietnam. The agreement specifies that the military demarcation line at the 17th parallel is only provisional and not a political or territorial boundary. While this was not spelled out in the July 1971 proposal, point 7 of the 8 May 1969 proposal said: "The military demarcation line between the two zones at the 17th parallel, as provided for by the 1954 Geneva agreements, is

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only of a provisional character and does not constitute in any way a political or territorial boundary." While the July 1971 proposal said that pending reunification there would be "free movement" between the two zones, the agreement says that among the questions to be negotiated are "the modalities of civilian movement across the provisional military demarcation line."

+ Chapter VI: Articles 16 through 19 on supervision and control spell out the functions of the bodies which were merely listed in the summary--the four-party and two-party Joint Military Commissions, the International Commission of Control and Supervision, and an international conference. A 2 December NHAN DAN article atypically had discussed the international control commission when it castigated Foreign Minister Malik for saying that Indonesia as a member was prepared to send approximately 2,000 troops. The paper did not directly address itself to U.S. statements favoring efforts to insure that the control commission would be in place to be activated at the time of a cease-fire. But it questioned why Indonesia had to send troops to Vietnam and asserted that once the agreement was signed, "the commission would conform to the organizational system and obligations prescribed for it."

+ Chapter VII: Article 20 on Laos and Cambodia is identical to point 7 of the October summary in saying that the Paris conference participants undertake to refrain from using those territories to encroach on the sovereignty of one another and of those countries, and that foreign countries will put an end to military activities in and totally withdraw from Laos and Cambodia.

+ Chapter VIII: Articles 21 and 22 essentially repeat the October summary in saying that the United States will contribute to healing the wounds of war and to postwar reconstruction in the DRV and that with the peace accord there will be new conditions for establishing a "new, equal, and mutually beneficial relationship." Point 4 of the DRV's nine-point proposal of 26 June 1971 had said that the United States "must assume the entire responsibility for the damage caused by the United States to the entire Vietnamese people. The DRV and the PRG request from the U.S. Government reparations for damage it caused in the two zones of Vietnam."

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MOSCOW PRAISES AGREEMENT, PLEDGES CONTINUED SUPPORT

In comment keynoted by messages from the three top Soviet leaders to the DRV and PRG leaders on the day the agreement was signed, as well as in PRAVDA editorial comment keyed to the initialing and signing, Moscow has hailed the accord as a victory both for the Vietnamese and for the communist countries that supported their struggle. The Brezhnev-Podgornyy-Kosygin message to the DRV leaders noted that the conclusion of an agreement providing for a U.S. withdrawal and an end to interference in Vietnam proves that no force can break the will of people "fighting for their inalienable rights and enjoying the support of all the progressive forces of the world." The message expressed a pervasive companion theme of Moscow's comment when it recalled the USSR's steadfast aid and support and stated that the efforts of "the socialist community" and of worldwide antiwar forces had been an important factor leading to the agreement. The message to the PRG leaders referred in a similar vein to the effective military, political, and diplomatic struggle waged by the Vietnamese and termed the "victory" a joint one for the Vietnamese and the "socialist community."

Brezhnev played the joint-victory theme in a 30 January talk with the visiting Le Duc Tho and in a speech at a banquet that day honoring Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh, also on a Moscow stopover. The theme recurred in a speech by the chairman of the Soviet-Vietnamese Friendship Society at a 30 January Moscow public meeting held to welcome the agreement, attended by Le Duc Tho and several Soviet Politburo members. And PRAVDA, in an editorial article on the 25th and an editorial on the 28th, greeted the initialing and signing in similar terms.

In his 30 January banquet speech Brezhnev expanded on the theme, present from the outset in Moscow's comment, that an end to the Vietnam hostilities will open new prospects for detente elsewhere in the world. Mazurov on the 26th, speaking at a reception on India's national day, had said the agreement would "open new favorable prospects for further easing of tensions, for consolidation of peace and security in the Asian continent and throughout the world." The two leaders' messages asserted in a similar vein that the establishment of peace in Vietnam would improve prospects "to ease further international tensions and strengthen peace and security in Asia and in other countries." Brezhnev on the 30th, charging that the "forces of aggression and reaction" had used the Vietnam war to "intensify international tensions and step up the

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arms race," stated that a political settlement would now remove obstacles to "wide international cooperation" and could be expected to have "a positive effect on the relations among states that were involved in one way or another in the events in Indochina."

Where Mazurov and the leaders' messages highlighted Asia, Brezhnev mentioned prospects for a peaceful solution in the Middle East* and went on to refer briefly to new possibilities for easing tensions in Europe and in Asia. In this context he pointed to the importance of "socialist unity" and "joint action" during the Vietnam war and asserted that the strengthening of socialist unity and cohesion remains the Soviet Union's "principled line." In what may be read as a response to Peking's censure of Moscow's proposal for an Asian collective security system, he added that this policy has nothing to do with "a policy of blocs, of creating military groupings directed against the interests of other states."

Stress on the steadfastness of past Soviet aid to Vietnam has been coupled with avowals that the USSR will continue to support Vietnamese efforts to settle their own affairs and assertions that it is necessary to assure "strict compliance" with the agreement by all parties. But Moscow has avoided explicit discussion of its possible future role in guaranteeing the accord and has said little about the projected international conference. Brezhnev, in the banquet speech on the 30th, said briefly and without elaboration that the USSR will "take an active part" in the international conference, which will play an "important role" in insuring compliance with the agreement. A panelist in the 28 January domestic service commentators' roundtable had briefly referred to the agreement's provision for an international conference and commented that "the international public will be watching most attentively to see that no opportunity is given to those who would like to tear up this peace to achieve their aims."

The theme that the struggle is not yet over and that great efforts will still be necessary to carry out the agreement has threaded through most of the comment. Like other comment, the PRAVDA

* See the Middle East section of this TRENDS.

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editorial of the 28th spoke of the need for strict implementation of the accord to create conditions for socialist construction in the DRV, development of democracy in the South, and evolution toward "a single, democratic, peaceful, independent, and prosperous Vietnam." Stressing the need for strict implementation, a 29 January article in PRAVDA assailed "those who are trying to sow distrust" in the agreement, particularly the "extremely reactionary circles" in the United States and in the Saigon regime. It went on, rather lamely, to warn advocates of aggressive policies to remember that "people who defend their freedom and independence cannot be conquered."

The question of Laos and Cambodia has generally been ignored in Moscow comment on the peace agreement. Brezhnev at the banquet on the 30th merely noted briefly that now "more favorable conditions are created for ending the bloodshed in Laos and Cambodia."

REPORTAGE Moscow has duly reported the major developments surrounding the signing of the accords. The text of the peace agreement, along with summaries of the protocols, appeared on the 26th in both PRAVDA and IZVESTIYA, summaries having been disseminated initially by TASS and Moscow radio. In briefly reporting Kissinger's press conference, TASS on 25 January had singled out his remarks that the United States was striving for "normalization" of relations with the DRV, his view that there will also be cease-fires in Laos and Cambodia, and his statement that the United States will continue to recognize and aid the Thieu regime. TASS also noted that in reply to a question Kissinger said the agreement does not restrict U.S. forces stationed in Thailand or off the coasts of Vietnam.

Following the signing of the agreements, Moscow reported the first implementation moves including the VPA and PLAF cease-fire orders, the arrival of the ICCS representatives in Saigon, the first meeting of the joint four-power military commission, and the beginning of the final U.S. troop withdrawal. On the 29th TASS reported a "bellicose" statement by Thieu that was hostile to the notion of reconciliation with the NFLSV. TASS also quoted Thieu as repeating the warning that communists found in the Saigon-controlled zone would be shot. Moscow media on the 30th carried straightforward reports, without comment, on the Vietnamese communist protests against truce violations.

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DRV LEADERS Moscow's support for the Vietnamese has been high-
IN USSR lighted by the publicity for the stopovers of
Le Duc Tho and Nguyen Duy Trinh en route home to
Hanoi. Trinh stopped in Moscow briefly on the 25th on his way to
Paris to sign the peace agreements, but the brief report did not
indicate that he saw any Soviet leaders at that time. He arrived
in Moscow again on the 30th on his way home and is still there.
He was met at the airport by Suslov, Katushev, and Gromyko.

Le Duc Tho, arriving in Moscow on the 26th on his way home from
Paris, was met at the airport by Kirilenko and Katushev--his
usual hosts during his Moscow stopovers. He attended the Moscow
public meeting on the 30th and on the same day had talks with
Brezhnev "in an atmosphere of cordiality and fraternal friendship."
Both Tho and Trinh were feted at the banquet the same day by
Brezhnev, Kosygin, and the rest of the Politburo except for
Podgornyy. Le Duc Tho departed for home on the 30th, but there
is no report thus far that he has arrived back in Hanoi.

Hoang Van Hoan, VWP Politburo member and vice chairman of the DRV
National Assembly Standing Committee, has also left Moscow for
home, according to a PRAVDA report on 26 January. Noting that
Hoan had taken part in the USSR's 50th anniversary celebrations
and "had then been resting in the Soviet Union," PRAVDA did not
give the date of his departure. It reported that he was seen off
by a CPSU Central Committee candidate member and other party
officials. Thus far there have been no further reports of his
whereabouts. He had arrived in Moscow on 18 December with Truong
Chinh's delegation for the Soviet anniversary, and the last
previous mention of his whereabouts had been a report that he
took part in talks with Suslov on 29 December, the day before
Truong Chinh left Moscow for home.

PEKING HAILS AGREEMENT, SEES REDUCTION OF TENSION IN ASIA

Having promptly signaled its welcome for the Vietnam agreement
by its extensive coverage of announcements and texts of the
accords, Peking waited until the day after the 27 January signing
ceremonies to weigh in with authoritative comment in the form of
a PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial hailing the agreement as "a tremendous
victory" for the Vietnamese people that will have "a positive
influence" on the reduction of tension in Asia. On the 29th Peking
conveyed its sanction at the highest level in a message signed by
Mao and the other three top leaders in the formal hierarchy. In

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keeping with the editorial's assertion that the agreement affirmed Vietnam's unity, the Chinese leaders' message was addressed jointly to both the DRV and the PRG leaders--a departure from the standard practice, adhered to by the Soviets on this occasion, of sending separate messages to the DRV and PRG leaderships.

Peking's decision to time its authoritative comment to follow the signing of the agreement was also reflected in speeches on the 28th by Chinese leaders on the occasion of visits by foreign officials. Reporting the first such comment by a Peking leader, NCNA disseminated excerpts dealing with the Vietnam agreement from a speech by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, who said at a banquet welcoming the Chilean foreign minister that the agreement was "a major event" in the present-day world. A Chinese vice defense minister also hailed the agreement at a banquet on the 28th for a Tanzanian delegation.

Earlier, in addition to carrying a stream of Vietnamese announcements and the texts of the agreement and protocols, Peking provided a straightforward account, without comment, of President Nixon's 23 January television address announcing the agreement. The account quoted the President's avowal of continuing support for the Thieu regime as the sole legitimate government of South Vietnam, but it omitted his assessment of the agreement as meeting the conditions he laid down in addresses last year. While including his expectation that "other interested nations" will help ensure the implementation of the accord, the account omitted the President's appeal to the other major powers to exercise mutual restraint.

While duly acclaiming its Vietnamese allies for their achievements in what the Chinese message called "a shining model of the contemporary war of national liberation," Peking made clear its welcome for the settlement as a means of freeing the trends toward detente in Asia from the encumbrances of great-power engagement in the Vietnam conflict. According to the editorial, the war had begun with U.S. "sabotage" of the 1954 accords and intervention in Vietnam but has now ended with U.S. withdrawal and the opening of a new phase in which the Vietnamese sides themselves will determine their destiny. Reflecting Peking's interest in this development, the editorial observed that "strict" implementation of the agreement will have "a positive influence on the reduction of tension in Asia and the whole world." Earlier, in a Paris-dated dispatch on 26 January, NCNA had made a point of citing Secretary Rogers' arrival statement invoking the President personally and the U.S. Government as being prepared to turn all efforts toward "making peace work."

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As for the political evolution of South Vietnam, Peking has called for the parties involved to proceed "step by step" through peaceful means in conformity with "the reality" of two administrations and two zones of control. In this context the PEOPLE'S DAILY editorial also made a point of stressing Vietnam's unity as having been "affirmed" by the agreement. The leaders' message expressed hope that the South Vietnamese parties will "speedily" set up a national council as well as councils at lower levels, hold general elections, and make "a continuous advance" toward national unity.

While pledging to continue its support for its allies in Vietnam and Indochina generally, Peking has remained silent on the questions of Laos and Cambodia as well as its role in an international conference. Making use of the image that was prominent during PRG Foreign Minister Binh's recent visit to Peking, PEOPLE'S DAILY declared that the Chinese and Vietnamese peoples "are of the same family" and that the Chinese will continue their support in the "new stage" of the Vietnamese struggle. In a passage with anti-Soviet overtones, the editorial referred to oppression by "hegemonists" and pointed to a trend in Indochina and elsewhere toward independence and self-determination.

SIHANOUK GOES TO HANOI AMID UNCERTAINTY OVER CAMBODIA

Cambodian Prince Sihanouk's front has not kept pace with its Peking mentor in acclaiming the Vietnam agreement and has shown signs of uncertainty about its future in the wake of the Vietnam settlement. Brief messages from Sihanouk and Premier Penn Nouth to the DRV and PRG leaderships, released by the front's press agency on 28 January, offered "warm congratulations" on the signing of the agreement but made no claim of a victory by the Vietnamese. Invoking the hardline joint statement of the 1970 Indochinese summit conference, the messages pledged to strengthen the Cambodians' "militant solidarity and fraternal friendship" with the Vietnamese in face of "U.S. imperialism and its lackeys."

A joint statement issued by Sihanouk, Penn Nouth, and Deputy Premier Khieu Samphan, dated 26 January but not released by NCNA and Sihanouk's media until 30 and 31 January respectively, briefly expressed "joy" over the signing of the Vietnam agreement and professed the front's desire for peace while blaming the war in Cambodia on the United States and Lon Nol's "traitorous clique." The statement reaffirmed Sihanouk's March 1970 five-point program as the "basis" for extricating Cambodia from the war, but it failed to press the intransigent line of opposition

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to negotiations or a cease-fire that has marked the front's statements in the past. In an appeal to its Asian allies for support, the statement called on the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, China, Korea, and the rest of the world to oppose any "eventual U.S. imperialist attack against our liberated zone."

This is the first known occasion on which Sihanouk and Penn Nouth, both headquartered in Peking, have issued a joint statement along with Khieu Samphan, identified as deputy premier, defense minister, and commander-in-chief leading the fight in the Cambodian "interior." The use of this vehicle now may be intended to convey a sense of unity between the Peking-based segment of the movement and the insurgent forces in the homeland.

The joint statement's defensive stress on the front's peaceful intent and the absence of attacks on a negotiated settlement may reflect the "reexamination" of attitudes which Sihanouk mentioned in a 29 January AFP interview. According to Sihanouk, this reexamination is for the purpose not of modifying the basic goals of ousting Lon Nol and ending American "neocolonialism" but of gaining world understanding. Reflecting pressure from the Chinese and others, he acknowledged that "our friends" had warned him against appearing to be a warmonger at a time when "peace is being built." He expressed willingness to hold bilateral talks with the United States while rejecting a conference that would include Lon Nol. At the same time, however, he warned that Chou En-lai assured him that if the United States violates the Vietnam agreement by continuing its arms supplies to Lon Nol, China will "reserve the right" to send arms aid to the Cambodian insurgents.

In another reflection of the fluidity of the situation, Sihanouk also said on the 29th that the views of the Cambodian resistance in the interior would prevail in the reappraisal of the situation and that no joint declaration would be issued on his impending visit to Hanoi if this reappraisal was not completed before the end of the trip. This suggests that the front's next move will be discussed among its leaders during his visit and will be a subject of what may be difficult consultations with the North Vietnamese. He was warmly welcomed in Hanoi upon his arrival on 30 January for what has been billed as a Tet holiday visit. This is Sihanouk's fifth publicized visit to Hanoi since being ousted from power; his last visit, from 26 to 28 October, came at the time when Hanoi had released a summary of the Vietnam draft agreement and gave the two sides an opportunity for consultations on coordinating their next moves.

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Prior to his 29 January interview, Sihanouk had been repeating in AFP interviews his usual hard line regarding a Cambodian settlement. According to a 27 January AFP report, Sihanouk warned that the Vietnam agreement would be violated and that elections would never take place. He reiterated that "there is no question of a cease-fire in Cambodia" and that the war will continue there. In an interview reported by AFP on the 28th, he repeated his warning that if the international control commission attempted to interfere in Cambodia the representatives would be considered invaders and fired on.

Lon Nol's 28 January announcement of a unilateral cease-fire in Cambodia effective the 29th to allow the Vietnamese communist troops to withdraw has been denounced in some low-level communist comment. A 31 January commentary over Sihanouk's radio called the cease-fire announcement a "conjurer's trick" to deceive public opinion and charged that on the day it was declared the U.S. imperialists and their "lackeys" intensified their military activities. It made no mention of the issue of Vietnamese troops, but the Hanoi radio in commentaries on 30 January denounced Lon Nol's "slandorous" charges that the DRV and PRG are committing aggression against Cambodia and demanded that the United States cease its intervention in Cambodia.

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MIDDLE EAST

BREZHNEV SAYS VIETNAM ACCORD SHOWS WAY TO PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT

Declaring in his 30 January Kremlin dinner speech that the Vietnam accord showed that it is possible to find a peaceful and just solution to other conflicts, Brezhnev cited the Middle East situation "above all" but did not elaborate. In his last remarks on the Middle East, in his 21 December report marking the USSR's 50th anniversary, Brezhnev had observed that those wanting to strengthen world peace should exert efforts to extinguish the "hotbed of fire" in the Middle East and "eliminate the consequences of Israeli aggression." While many countries had come out for resolving the Mideast problem on the basis of relevant Security Council resolutions, he added, words needed to be supported by "concrete political actions," thereby compelling Israel to agree to a peaceful settlement and to recognize the legitimate rights of the Arab people. Brezhnev concluded his 21 December remarks by observing that the USSR's "readiness to contribute to this" was well known.

The Vietnamese experience has been pointedly held up to the Arabs as an example for their own struggle in Moscow broadcasts in Arabic on 27 and 29 January. The first argued that if the United States had been obliged to concede the error of its "policy of force" and accept a peaceful political settlement in Vietnam, Israel too would be obliged to retreat and accept such a settlement in the Middle East. It stressed that the Vietnam experience demonstrated the value of combining "resolute military action" with "different forms of political and diplomatic struggle." The second commentary lectured the Arabs on the effectiveness of NLF-SV unity and once again urged them to overcome their "many systems, forces, and different socio-political currents" and achieve unity of action. An Arabic-language commentary on 10 January had underscored Soviet exasperation with Arab failure to coordinate actions or solve "existing known differences."

Routine, low-volume Moscow comment on the Arab-Israeli dispute in the past several weeks has continued to maintain that Security Council Resolution 242 should be the basis of a settlement and that Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories is essential. While offering no suggestions of

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its own, Moscow has shrugged off reports of possible "new so-called peace initiatives" by the United States. Noting that Secretary Rogers in a 17 January speech had said he felt 1973 would be favorable for talks on the Middle East, a domestic service broadcast concluded that no new U.S. initiative could be expected because the Secretary described as the subject of such talks "the old American plan" for a provisional settlement based on opening the Suez Canal, a plan already criticized by the Arabs.

While a sudden recent flurry of diplomatic activity in the Middle East has been indicated in Arab media, Moscow, following standard practice, has not acknowledged the various Soviet-Arab contacts. Perhaps coincidentally, the Soviet ambassadors in Cairo, Damascus, Baghdad, and Aden all had talks with top officials in those capitals within a few days of each other. In Cairo, Ambassador Vinogradov met with Foreign Minister az-Zayyat on 23 January and was received a day later by President as-Sadat in what Lebanese papers reported was apparently their first meeting since the expulsion of the Soviet military advisers from Egypt last July. According to Beirut's AN-NAHAR on the 31st, Vinogradov inquired about reported Egyptian-American contacts and asked if as-Sadat intended to visit the PRC. In Damascus, President al-Asad received the Soviet ambassador to Syria on the 25th, while in Baghdad Ambassador Likhachev was received by Saddam Husayn and President al-Bakr on the 24th and 30th, respectively. Aden radio reported that Ambassador Polyakov met with South Yemeni leaders 'Abd al-Fattah Isma'il, on the 20th, and Salim Rubay' 'Ali, on the 24th.

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EUROPE FORCE CUTS

SOVIET BLOC MEDIA PROVIDE MINIMAL COVERAGE OF MBFR TALKS

Comment from Moscow and its allies on the issue of mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe has continued in low key since 18 January, when the Soviet Union publicized its reply to the NATO allies' invitation to hold the talks,* and has avoided substantive issues. The focus has been on such questions as the timing of the MBFR talks in relation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and on the question of which countries should participate. The emphasis has been on the preparatory nature of the Vienna consultations opening on 31 January. Bucharest media have notably refrained from any direct comment on force reductions during the period of the diplomatic exchanges between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and at this writing Bucharest has yet to acknowledge that Romania is represented.

Only the GDR's radio, on the morning of the 31st, has publicly listed all the Vienna participants, including Romania and Bulgaria--both "registered as participants" on the "socialist side," in addition to the USSR and the other four Warsaw Pact states; on the Western side, it listed the original seven full NATO participants and the five with observer status. In keeping with Soviet bloc comment, the GDR radio did not describe any of the delegations as full participants or observers.

PARTICIPATION IN THE TALKS Press reports on the Soviet bloc's responses indicated that the preparatory talks could be attended by "all interested European states" and the United States and Canada, adding pointedly, however, that such participation would not predetermine the parties to any future conference and any future agreement on force reductions. With the exception of East Berlin, the other bloc states ignored their proposal of Vienna as an alternate to Geneva as the site for the preparatory talks until the weekend of the 27th.

* All of Moscow's allies except the GDR publicized their notes of reply on the same day. East German media made its note public on the 23d.

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As the NATO-Warsaw Pact diplomatic exchange continued, the comment, led by Moscow, shifted from stress on participation of "all interested" states to the notion that the participants should include countries which would reduce their armed forces and on whose territories troops were stationed and would be reduced--reflecting the language of the Soviet Union's 27 January memorandum.

Although the 18 January response went a long way toward accommodating the long-standing Romanian position that any European security problem should be solved by "all" European states, Bucharest media avoided comment on the talks. Ceausescu, in a series of public speeches from 19 through 27 January, did not comment directly on MBFR. On the 25th, however, he said Romania "is paying special attention to the military problem in Europe" and asserted that "all states must participate in resolving these problems," listing such issues as "military disengagement," reduction and withdrawal of foreign troops from other states' territories, and reduction of national troops.

The possibility of future French participation in MBFR talks was suggested in the Soviet bloc comment. Moscow's followup comment on the Pompidou-Brezhnev talks in Minsk openly discussed the prospect of a shift in France's position. For example, writing in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on the 18th, Leonid Zamyatin recalled Pompidou's statement to the press in Minsk that he and Brezhnev had discussed force reductions and that France would continue to discuss the issue. Zamyatin then cited LE MONDE to illustrate a "greater flexibility" in the French position and to suggest that Pompidou was receptive to Brezhnev's "appeal" for French participation in the talks.

Warsaw press commentaries, on the 20th and 22d in particular, observed that other countries, "including France," could help establish the agenda and procedural matters for the "conference." The articles argued sarcastically that the Pact's proposal did not mean that all the participants in the Helsinki talks should attend the "conference proper" but that such "military powers" as Liechtenstein and San Marino should be spared "even the appearance of discrimination."

TIMING Echoing Brezhnev's remarks in Budapest last November, Moscow and Budapest have stressed that for successful talks on force reduction, the "political climate" in Europe must be "appropriate" and that a successful European security conference is a prerequisite to such an atmosphere. Comment by Moscow and its allies has routinely insisted that MBFR must remain independent of the CSCE, stressing in particular that this was unequivocally stated in the Brezhnev-Pompidou Minsk communique.

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OTHER ISSUES The recent comment has avoided any in-depth discussion of the problems confronting the formal negotiations, observing only that the talks will be long, difficult, and complex. Budapest's MAGYAR HIRLAP on the 20th said pointedly that the Western ideas on force reductions are "very remote" from those of the Warsaw Pact states. NOVOSTI's military commentator Koslov, writing in a Prague paper on the 25th, observed that the U.S.-Soviet communique last May said force reductions would primarily concern central Europe and that "this formulation does not mean the geographical point of view, but a definition of the strategic sphere in which the main forces of the two military groupings are stationed"--a conception broad enough to embrace such issues as the role of the U.S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean and NATO's flank areas.

Warsaw media have understandably stressed the primacy of reaching an agreement on central Europe. One Polish press article asserted that it is also "natural" that the problem of reducing foreign troops and not national armed forces "will be the first and relatively easier stage" of the negotiations.

TANJUG ON ROMANIAN VIEWS Citing "official sources" in Bucharest, Belgrade's TANJUG on the 31st outlined Romania's unique position on the forthcoming talks. TANJUG reported that Bucharest would consider "unacceptable" the involvement of a limited number of participants in the initial talks if there is no commitment to extend future talks to cover "other" regions--that is, the Balkans--where troops are stationed or military bases are located on foreign territory. The subject of force reductions in other areas besides central Europe has been discussed in Soviet bloc media, which have linked discussion of this possibility to the successful conclusion of talks on central Europe.

After indicating that Romania does not believe European security can be discussed without including military aspects, TANJUG said that Bucharest, following the recent conference of Warsaw Pact foreign ministers, "no longer insists on disarmament talks within" the CSCE but believes that the current "consultative" meeting in Vienna should be followed by negotiations on military disengagement in central Europe. TANJUG went on to say that Romania then envisaged a second stage of talks which would negotiate military disengagement in "other" regions of Europe, followed by a third stage in which "all countries concerned" would meet to discuss military issues exclusively, such as military budgets and standards of behavior in international relations. The three-stage Romanian proposal reported by TANJUG is not inconsistent with what has been said publicly by Ceausescu and other Romanian spokesmen over the past year.

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GERMANY

HUNGARIAN ARTICLE OUTLINES EAST GERMAN STAND ON REPARATIONS

An article in the Hungarian party organ NEPSZABADSAG on 20 January has outlined East Germany's position on World War II reparation claims--a subject rarely discussed in GDR media. The article follows a recent spate of comment in the West European and U.S. press on possible reparations and other claims by Western countries in the event of their establishment of diplomatic relations with the GDR.

The Hungarian article stated that the GDR had "complied with its obligations to the Soviet Union and Poland as long ago as 1953" and that claims for war reparations by the Western allies would be "out of place" because, "if for no other reason," the Potsdam Agreement stipulates that such claims "should be satisfied by the FRG."* The article asserted that the GDR's rights were not affected by the fact that under the 1953 London agreement 19 states granted Bonn a moratorium on reparations until the conclusion of a peace treaty. Acknowledging, however, that there may be claims other than for reparations, the NEPSZABADSAG article concluded that "as far as compensatory and other claims arising from the nationalization of foreign assets are concerned, Berlin is prepared to discuss them on the basis of the principle of reciprocity."

The GDR's position on the reparations question was set forth in December in a rare public discussion of the German peace treaty issue in East German media. Speaking on East Berlin television on 12 December, Professor Wuensche, President of the GDR Society for International Law, asserted that "most" of the questions raised in 1945 in connection with a peace treaty, including such problems as "reparations, restitution, and other questions," had "practically been solved." Wuensche also insisted that the only possible peace treaty was one that would be reached by the anti-Hitler coalition with the GDR on the one hand and with the FRG on the other.

* The 1945 Potsdam Agreement provided that, in general, Soviet and Polish reparation claims should be met by removal of assets from the then occupied Soviet zone and the claims of the United States, Britain, and "other countries" from the Western zones.

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USSR INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SHELEPIN CREDITS MAJOR FOREIGN POLICY SUCCESSSES TO BREZHNEV

In a remarkable tribute to his old rival Brezhnev, going beyond even the plaudits of Brezhnev's close supporters in the leadership, Politburo member Shelepin has credited recent Soviet foreign policy successes to Brezhnev personally without--like Brezhnev proteges Kunayev and Shcherbitskiy--giving credit to the Politburo as well. He declared on 22 January, in a speech to an all-Union trade union council plenum reported the next day in TRUD: "Our peace campaign in accordance with the Peace Program and all the very important foreign policy acts implemented by the party and government recently, and primarily in the past year, are inseparably linked with the name of Central Committee General Secretary Comrade L. I. Brezhnev."

Shelepin's speech was also replete with praise for Brezhnev's "brilliant" 50th anniversary speech, which he said had made a "truly enormous and indelible impression." Shelepin's formulation on Brezhnev's foreign policy successes was reiterated in the trade union council decree published in TRUD the next day. The decree also praised the Central Committee, the Politburo, and Brezhnev "personally" for deciding foreign and domestic problems "with Leninist farsightedness and revolutionary boldness and sweep."

The only comparable praise for Brezhnev's role in foreign affairs has come from Belorussian First Secretary Masherov, who, like Shelepin, had appeared cool to Brezhnev in the past. On 31 May Masherov credited Brezhnev with a "truly outstanding" role in the summit talks and in concluding the treaty with West Germany, and on 15 December he thanked the Central Committee and Brezhnev "personally" for their work in implementing the peace program.

A change in Shelepin's treatment of Brezhnev was first evident at the trade union congress last March, when Shelepin departed from established practice by elevating Brezhnev above the collective in referring to the Politburo "headed by" him. This formulation has occasionally been used by local leaders--most recently, by Tadzhik First Secretary Rasulov and Armenian First Secretary Kochinyan at the 50th anniversary ceremony on 21 December. But the Politburo members, with the sole exception of Kunayev, have avoided it.

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SHCHERBITSKIY OUSTS LEADER PROTECTED BY SHELEST

In his first personally conducted purge since becoming Ukrainian First Secretary, Shcherbitskiy on 26 January fired Poltava First Secretary A. M. Muzhitskiy for failings in agricultural leadership. Muzhitskiy's fall can be attributed to his longtime ties with Shcherbitskiy's rivals as well as to his oblast's chronic agricultural shortcomings. Muzhitskiy rose under Podgornyy's tutelage in Kharkov and owed his political survival to Shelest, who aggressively intervened in late 1970 to save Muzhitskiy from charges of corruption raised by a Moscow magazine and by the MVD, headed by Shcherbitskiy's former Dnepropetrovsk colleague N. A. Shchelokov.

Shcherbitskiy addressed the 26 January Poltava plenum which revealed massive shortfalls in 1971-72 agricultural production and sent the 60-year old Muzhitskiy into premature retirement. Afterward, Shcherbitskiy conferred with the oblast leaders on how to improve their work. His involvement in the Poltava purge is particularly noteworthy since he did not participate in a similar recent purge in Kherson Oblast, which led to the ouster of the first secretary and agriculture secretary.

Muzhitskiy had been in difficulty for several years but apparently was protected by his ties with Podgornyy and Shelest. He had risen to first deputy chairman of the Kharkov Oblast executive committee under Podgornyy, then Kharkov first secretary, and he rose to Poltava Oblast executive committee chairman and then to obkom first secretary after Podgornyy became Ukrainian first secretary. His association with Shelest probably dates back to the prewar period when Shelest was a Kharkov city secretary and Muzhitskiy a Kharkov raykom secretary. Although Shelest, after succeeding Podgornyy, repeatedly rebuked the Poltava leadership for poor agricultural results, he did not remove Muzhitskiy. For example, Muzhitskiy's speech at the November 1968 Ukrainian Central Committee plenum was condemned for blaming agricultural failures on objective causes, and his oblast's industrial and agricultural failings prompted the Ukrainian Politburo to issue a spring 1970 decree criticizing the oblast; but when the MVD and the Moscow satire magazine KROKODIL began exposing high-level corruption in Poltava, Shelest used his authority to quash the affair.

After a visit to Poltava, KROKODIL's responsible secretary V. D. Nadein, in a March 1970 KROKODIL article, publicized the MVD findings implicating a kolkhoz chairman for illegally presenting goods to local leaders. In September 1970, KROKODIL raised the case again, complaining that local leaders were protecting the kolkhoz chairman from punishment and citing Muzhitskiy's praise of the kolkhoz chairman. It was at this point that

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Shelest intervened to save Muzhitskiy; the Ukrainian Central Committee secretariat responded to the articles by absolving Poltava leaders of guilt and condemning the articles for making "unfounded accusations" against the Poltava oblast leaders. KROKODIL published the Ukrainian leaders' letter of response in a January 1971 issue along with a confession by the editors that Nadein's attack on the oblast leaders was "mistaken," and Nadein was fired.

Poltava continued to fall short in agriculture, however, as indicated by Shelest's sharp criticism of the oblast leaders at the early-1971 Ukrainian party congress. But despite the fact that the oblast is one of the key grain-producing areas in the Ukraine, no action was taken against Muzhitskiy until after Shelest's departure.

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